A continuous auction model with insiders and random time of information release by Corcuera, José Manuel et al.
Dept. of Math. University of Oslo
Pure Mathematics no 03
ISSN 0806–2439 November 2014
A continuous auction model with insiders and random time of
information release
José Manuel Corcuera∗, Giulia Di Nunno†, Gergely Farkas ‡, Bernt Øksendal §
November 6, 2014
Abstract
In a unified framework we study equilibrium in the presence of an insider having information on the
signal of the firm value, which is naturally connected to the fundamental price of the firm related asset.
The fundamental value itself is announced at a future random (stopping) time. We consider the two cases
in which this release time of information is known and not known, respectively, to the insider. Allowing
for very general dynamics, we study the structure of the insider’s optimal strategies in equilibrium and
we discuss market efficiency. With respect to market efficiency, we show that in the case the insider
knows the release time of information, the market is fully efficient. In the case the insider does not
know this random time, we see that there is no full efficiency, but there is nevertheless an equilibrium
where the sensitivity of prices is decreasing in time according with the probability that the announcement
time is greater than the current time. In other words, the prices become more and more stable as the
announcement approaches.
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1 Introduction
Models of financial markets with the presence of an insider or informational asymmetries have a large
literature, see e.g. Karatzas and Pikovsky (1996), Amendiger et al. (1998), Imkeller et al. (2001), Corcuera
et al. (2004), Biagini and Øksendal (2005), (2006), Kohatsu-Higa (2007), Di Nunno et al. (2006, 2008),
Biagini et al. (2012) and the references therein. In most of these models prices are fixed exogenously, i.e.
the insider does not affect the stock price dynamics, and the privileged information is a functional of the
stock price process: the maximum, the final value, etc. As pointed by Danilova (2010), in an equilibrium
situation market prices are determined by the demand of market participants, so in such a situation the
privileged information cannot be a functional of the stock price process because this implies the knowledge
of future demand and it is unrealistic. Then the privileged information is exogenous like the value of the
fundamental price, or some signal of it, or the announcement time of the release of the fundamental price,
which evolves independently of the demand. The questions considered in this paper deal with the existence
of an equilibrium and the properties of the insider’s optimal strategies. Moreover another question studied
is the efficiency of the market, namely the conditions in which market prices converge to the fundamental
one. These problems have been addressed in different works, with different degrees of generality, and with
very different types of insider’s privileged information and demands of the uninformed traders.
The original model is due to Kyle (1985), he considers three kind of actors in the market: market makers,
uninformed traders and one insider who knows the fundamental or liquidation value of an asset at certain
fixed released time, there is also, in the model, a price function establishing the relation between market
prices and the total demand. He works in the discrete time setting, and with Gaussian random walks as
noises. Back (1992) extends the work to the continuous time case. These are the two seminal papers.
From then there has been several generalizations of the model: Back and Pedersen (1998) who consider
a dynamic fundamental price and Gaussian noises with time varying volatility; Cho (2003) who considers
pricing functions depending on the path of the demand process and studies what happens when the informed
trader is risk-averse; Lasserre (2004) who considers a multivariate setting; Aase et al. (2012a), (2012b) who
put emphasis in filtering techniques to solve the equilibrium problem; Campi and Çetin (2007), who consider
a defaultable bond, in the place of the stock in the Kyle-Back model, and the default time, as privileged
information; Danilova (2010) where the author considers non-regular pricing rules; Caldentey and Stacchetti
(2010) who consider a random release time, and Campi et al. (2013) where again the authors consider a
defaultable bond and the privileged information is not the default time anymore, but some dynamic signal
related with it, see example 23 below for more details. The list could be completed with the references in
the mentioned papers.
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The present paper extends the previous contributions in different ways. We consider general noises for the
demand processes, general pricing rules, random release times, and general dynamic information, all in the
same model. Then, we study in detail which are the necessary conditions needed to have an equilibrium.
These conditions are new in the literature. Specifically we consider the very general case in which an insider
has access to some signal related to the firm value, which is in fact released at some stopping time. We
first consider the case where the insider knows the random time of release of information and then the case
where this is also unknown to her. We study these two situations in the same framework with the purpose
of analyzing equilibrium and efficiency of the market.
Except for the multivariate setting of Lasserre (2004) and the risk-aversion considered in previous works,
this is a general setting for the previous extensions of the Kyle-Back model, as we show through different
examples.
Our study shows explicitly how equilibrium is a specific state of the market induced by the interplay of agents
with different roles and asymmetric information. Indeed, the market makers set rational prices which are
assumed to be a function H of the aggregate demand and time. For such H given, the insider optimizes her
position to maximize her expected wealth. The necessary conditions for the existence of an equilibrium show
how this optimization is possible only for some given pricing rules and under some available information
flows.
In this study we show that the presence of the insider can be beneficial to the market from an efficiency point
of view. In fact, if the insider knows the random release time, then the market is efficient. However, if this
time of release is unknown also to the insider, then the market is not fully efficient, nevertheless equilibrium
can be reached if the sensitivity of prices decreases in time according to the survival probability of the
announcement. In other words, the prices become more stable as the announcement time approaches.
As far as we know this generality of the insider’s information together with the presence of a random time
of release has never been studied before. Moreover, our contribution includes also very general dynamics for
the demand process. In fact the insider’s demand is allowed to be a general semimartingale. The present
paper includes also various examples in which we give explicit insider’s optimal strategies for a given pricing
rule and define the concept of admissibility for pricing rules and insider strategies. Here we show how our
results, coupled with the mathematical tools of enlargement of filtrations or filtering techniques, allow to
finding the insider’s optimal strategy in various cases presented in the literature, but here treated in a unified
framework.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the model that gives rise the stock prices
and we discuss the insider’s optimal strategies for a given pricing rule and define the concept of admissibility
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for pricing rules and insider strategies. In section 3 and 4 we discuss what happens when the release time is
known to the insider or not, respectively. Finally, in section 5, we give some examples.
2 The model and equilibrium
We consider a market with two assets, a stock of a firm and a bank account with interest rate r equal to zero
for the sake of simplicity. With abuse of terminology we will just write prices even though they are sometimes
“discounted” prices. The trading is continuous in time over the period [0,∞) and it is order driven. There
is a (possibly random) release time τ < ∞ a.s., when the fundamental value of the stock is revealed. The
fundamental value process, that we shall define in a precise way later, is denoted by V . We shall denote the
market price of the stock at time t by Pt. Just after the revelation time the price of the stock coincides with
the fundamental value. Then we consider Pt defined only on t ≤ τ . In principle, it is possible that Pt 6= Vt
if t ≤ τ, stopping our studies at this (random) time of release.
We assume that all the random variables and processes mentioned are defined in the same, complete, proba-
bility space (Ω,F ,P) and that the filtrations are complete and right-continuous by taking, if it is necessary,
the usual augmentation of them, as we shall specify below.
There are three kinds of traders. A large number of liquidity traders, who trade for liquidity or hedging
reasons, an informed trader or insider, who has privileged information about the firm and can deduce its
fundamental value, and the market makers, who set the market price and clear the market.
2.1 The agents and equilibrium
Let X be the demand process of the informed trader. At time t, her information is given by Ht and her flow
of information is given by the filtration H = (Ht)t≥0. It is natural to assume that X is an H-predictable
process. The informed trader, like any other trader, observes the market prices P and, in addition, she has
access to the firm value, having access to some signal process η directly related to the firm value. Moreover,
she will have some knowledge about the random time τ . In the sequel we will consider two cases:
• Ht = σ¯(Ps, ηs, τ, 0 ≤ s ≤ t), i.e. the informed trader has knowledge of the time of release of information
• Ht = σ¯(Ps, ηs, τ ∧ s, 0 ≤ s ≤ t), i.e. the informed trader has no knowledge of this release time, but she
will instantly know when it happens.
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Here σ¯ denotes the usual augmentation of a natural filtration σ (see [32], Ch. I, Def. 4.13). That is, e.g.,
σ¯(Ps, ηs, τ, 0 ≤ s ≤ t) :=
⋂
r>t
(σ(Ps, ηs, τ, 0 ≤ s ≤ r) ∪N ) ,
where N is the family of P-null sets in F , and σ(Ps, ηs, τ, 0 ≤ s ≤ r) is the natural filtration generated by
P, η, and τ.
In both the cases above, the insider has access to the fundamental value V which, in terms of the insider’s
information flow, is assumed to be a càdlàg H-martingale such that σ2V (t) :=
d[V,V ]ct
dt is well defined (where
[V, V ]c indicates the continuous part of the quadratic variation of V ) and V is taken in the form:
Vt = E(f(ητ )|Ht), t ≥ 0, (1)
where f is a non-negative deterministic function and η is some signal process related to the firm value. The
explicit presence of f gives a structure to the relationship between the type of signal and the fundamental
value, see Example 22 and Remark 10.
Let Z be the aggregate demand process of the liquidity traders. We recall that these are a large number of
traders motivated by liquidity or hedging reasons. They are perceived as constituting noise in the market,
thus also called noise traders. From the insider’s perspective we assume that Z is a continuous H-martingale,
independent of η and V , such that that σ2Z(t) :=
d[Z,Z]t
dt is well defined.
Market makers clear the market giving the market prices. They rely on the information given by the total
aggregate demand Y := X+Z which they observe and, just like the noise traders, they instantly know about
the time of release of information when that occurs. Hence their information flow is: F = (Ft)t≥0, where
Ft = σ¯(Ys, τ ∧ s, 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
Due to the competition among market makers, the market prices are rational, or competitive, in the sense
that
Pt = E(Vt|Ft), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ.
Finally we suppose that market makers give market prices through a pricing rule, which consists of a formula,
here assumed of the form:
Pt = H(t, ξt), t ≥ 0 (2)
involving
ξt :=
∫ t
0
λ(s)dYs,
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where λ ∈ C1 is a strictly positive deterministic function, H ∈ C1,2, H(t, ·) is strictly increasing for all t ≥ 0.
Note that Ft = σ¯(Ps, τ ∧ s, 0 ≤ s ≤ t), for all t. We have the following definition.
Definition 1 Denote the class of such pairs (H,λ) above by H. An element of H is called a pricing rule.
The informed trader is assumed risk-neutral and she aims at maximizing her expected final wealth. Let W
be the wealth process corresponding to insider’s portfolio X. We introduce the following definitions.
Definition 2 A strategy X is called optimal with respect to a price process P if it maximizes E(Wτ ).
Definition 3 Let (H,λ) ∈ H and consider a strategy X. The triple (H,λ,X) is an (a local) equilibrium, if
the price process P· := H(·, ξ·) is rational, given X, that is
Pt = E(Vt|Ft), 0 ≤ t ≤ τ, (3)
and the strategy X is (locally) optimal, given (H,λ).
Remark 4 It is important to remark that the effect of the total demand in prices is due not only to the
function λ, but also to the function H. In fact, as we shall see later, in some equilibrium cases, see Proposition
13,
dPt = ∂2H(t, ξt)λ(t)dYt,
and some authors give the name market depth to the quantity
1
∂2H(t, ξt)λ(t)
.
Here and in the sequel ∂iH denotes the derivative with respect to the ith variable. So, to say that the market
depth is constant is not equivalent to say that λ(t) is constant. Only if the equilibrium pricing rule is linear,
the two statements are equivalent. See Back and Pedersen (1998).
2.2 Wealth and admissible strategies
To illustrate the relationship among the processes V, P,X, and W we first consider a multi-period model
where trades are made at times i = 1, 2, . . . N, and where τ = N is random. If at time i−1, there is an order
to buy Xi −Xi−1 shares, its cost will be Pi(Xi −Xi−1), so, there is a change in the bank account given by
−Pi(Xi −Xi−1).
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Then the total (cumulated) change at τ = N is
−
N∑
i=1
Pi(Xi −Xi−1),
and due to the convergence of the market and the fundamental prices at time τ = N , there is the extra
income: XNVN . So, the total wealth Wτ at τ is
Wτ = −
N∑
i=1
Pi(Xi −Xi−1) +XNVN
= −
N∑
i=1
Pi−1(Xi −Xi−1)−
N∑
i=1
(Pi − Pi−1)(Xi −Xi−1) +XNVN .
Consider now the continuous time setting where we have the processes X,P, and V, and we take N trading
periods, where N is random and the trading times are: 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ ... ≤ tN = τ, then we have
Wτ = −
N∑
i=1
Pti−1(Xti −Xti−1)−
N∑
i=1
(Pti − Pti−1)(Xti −Xti−1) +XtNVtN ,
so if the time between trades goes to zero we will have
Wτ = XτVτ −
∫ τ
0
Pt−dXt − [P,X]τ
=
∫ τ
0
Xt−dVt +
∫ τ
0
Vt−dXt + [V,X]τ −
∫ τ
0
Pt−dXt − [P,X]τ
=
∫ τ
0
(Vt− − Pt−) dXt +
∫ τ
0
Xt−dVt + [V,X]τ − [P,X]τ , (4)
where (and throughout the whole article) Pt− = lims↑t Ps a.s. We shall asume that X is an H-predictable
càdlàg semimartingale, so that the stochastic integrals above can be seen as Itô’s integrals. Moreover, by
applying Itô’s formula to Pt = H(t, ξt), t ≥ 0, where ξ is now a càdlàg H-semimartingale, we can see that P
is also an H-semimartingale.
In the next subsection we discuss the characterization of an insider’s optimal strategy in equilibrium in terms
of fundamental value and insider information. Namely, we consider a process X that is optimal in the sense
that it maximizes
J(X) := E (Wτ ) = E
(∫ τ
0
(Vt− −H(t, ξt−))dXt +
∫ τ
0
Xt−dVt + [V,X]τ − [P,X]τ
)
,
for a pricing rule (H,λ) ∈ H. However for technical and modelling reasons, we require additional properties
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to the triplet (H,λ,X). In this way, we characterize the admissible triplets (H,λ,X) as those processes X
(that include, by hypothesis, the process X ≡ 0) and price functions (H,λ) ∈ H satisfying:
(A1) Xt = Mt + At +
∫ t
0
θsds, for all t ≥ 0,where M is a continuous H-martingale, A a finite variation
H-predictable process with At =
∑
0<s≤t (Xs −Xs−), and θ a càdlàg H-adapted process
(A2) E
(∫ τ
0
(∂2H(s, ξs))
2 (
σ2Z(s)ds+ σ
2
M (s)ds
))
<∞, where σ2M (s) := d[M,M ]sds
(A3) E
(∫ τ
0
∂2H(s, ξs)|θs|ds
)
<∞
(A4) E (
∑τ
0 ∂2H(s, ξs−)|∆Xs|) <∞, ∆Xs := Xs −Xs−
(A5) E
(∫ τ
0
|Xs|2 d[V, V ]s
)
<∞
(A6) E
(∫ τ
0
λ(s)|∂22H(s, ξs)|
(
σ2M (s) + |σM,Z(s)|
)
)ds
)
<∞, where σM,Z(s) := d[M,Z]sds .
Recall that ∂i indicates the derivative w.r.t. the ith argument.
Remark 5 Note that, since (Xt)t≥0 is a càdlàg H-predictable process, its martingale part cannot have
jumps, see Corollary 2.31 in Jacod and Shiryaev (1987). Similarly, we have chosen Z to be continuous
before.
We can recall the essential assumptions of the model as follows. Our stochastic basis is a complete filtered
space (Ω,F ,F,H,P), where F ⊆ H are the filtrations defined in the subsection 2.1. Roughly speaking,
F contains information about market prices or total demand and H includes also information about the
fundamental value V . We have market prices Pt = H(t, ξt), where H is a C1,2 function, H(t, ·) strictly
increasing, ξt =
∫ t
0
λ(s)dYs, and λ is a C1 strictly positive function. From the rationality assumption (3)
we have that P is an F-martingale. The total demand process is given by Y = X + Z , with Z an H-
continuous martingale such that σ2Z(s) :=
d[Z,Z]s
ds . The fundamental value V is a càdlàg H-martingale such
that σ2V (t) :=
d[V,V ]ct
dt and V has the structure (1). Finally the release time τ is a stopping time with respect
to F and H.
2.3 The optimality condition
In the sequel we will consider two kinds of stopping times: τ bounded, or τ finite but independent of
(V, P, Z). In both cases, by the assumptions that V is an H-martingale and X an H-predictable càdlàg
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H-semimartingale satisfying (A5) we have that E(
∫ τ
0
XtdVt) = 0. In fact, if τ is bounded we can apply
Doob’s Optional Sampling Theorem and if τ is finite but independent of (V, P, Z), we have that
E
(∫ τ
0
XtdVt
)
= E
(
E
(∫ τ
0
XsdVs
∣∣∣∣ τ = t)∣∣∣∣
t=τ
)
= E
(
E
(∫ t
0
XsdVs
)∣∣∣∣
t=τ
)
= 0.
Hence,
J(X) := E (Wτ ) = E
(∫ τ
0
(Vt− −H(t, ξt−))dXt + [V,X]τ − [P,X]τ
)
. (5)
First, note that
∫ τ
0
(Vt− −H(t, ξt−))dXt + [V,X]τ − [P,X]τ =
∫ τ−
0
(Vt− −H(t, ξt−))dXt + [V,X]τ− − [P,X]τ−
+ (Vτ −H(τ, ξτ )) ∆Xτ .
Then suppose that X is (locally) optimal and we modify only the the last jump of this strategy, by taking
(1 + εγ)∆Xτ with γ an Hτ−-measurable and bounded random variable and ε > 0 small enough. We recall
that Hτ− := H0 ∨ σ(A ∩ (τ > t) : A ∈ Ht, t ≥ 0) (see, e.g., Revuz and Yor (1999), page 46). Denote X(ε)
this new strategy.
Then we obtain
d
dε
J(X(ε))
∣∣∣
ε=0
= E
(
γ
(
(Vτ −H(τ, ξτ )) ∆Xτ − λ(τ)∂2H(τ, ξτ ) (∆Xτ )2
))
,
so
E
(
(Vτ −H(τ, ξτ )) ∆Xτ − λ(τ)∂2H(τ, ξτ ) (∆Xτ )2
∣∣∣Hτ−) = 0. (6)
Now we modify the strategyX by taking an H-adapted càdlàg process β such thatX·+ε
∫ ·
0
βsds is admissible,
with ε > 0 small enough.
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We have
0 =
d
dε
J(X· + ε
∫ ·
0
βsds)
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
=
d
dε
E
(∫ τ
0
(Vt− −H(t,
∫ t−
0
λ(s)(dXs + εβsds+ dZs)))(dXt + εβtdt)
)∣∣∣∣
ε=0
− d
dε
E
(
[V,X· + ε
∫ ·
0
βsds]τ − [H(·,
∫ ·
0
λ(s)(dXs + εβsds+ dZs), X· + ε
∫ ·
0
βsds]τ
)∣∣∣∣
ε=0
= E
(∫ τ
0
(Vt− −H(t, ξt))βtdt
)
− E
(∫ τ
0
∂2H(t, ξt−)
(∫ t
0
λ(s)β(s)ds
)
dXt
)
− E
([
∂2H(·, ξ·)
(∫ ·
0
λ(s)β(s)ds
)
, X·
]
τ
)
= E
(∫ τ
0
(
(Vt −H(t, ξt))− λ(t)
∫ τ
t∧τ
∂2H(s, ξs−)dXs
)
βtdt
)
− E
(∫ τ
0
(∫ t
0
λ(s)β(s)ds
)
d [∂2H(·, ξ·), X·]t
)
= E
(∫ τ
0
(
(Vt −H(t, ξt))− λ(t)
(∫ τ
t∧τ
∂2H(s, ξs−)dXs + [∂2H(·, ξ·), X·]τt
))
βtdt
)
,
where [·, ·]τt = [·, ·]τ− [·, ·]t. Since we can take βt = αu1(u,u+h](t) αu, with αu Hu-measurable and bounded,
we have
E
(∫ u+h
u
(
E(1[0,τ ](t) (Vt −H(t, ξt))
∣∣Ht)− λ(t)E(∫ τ
t∧τ
∂2H(s, ξs−)dXs + [∂2H(·, ξ·), X·]τt∧τ
∣∣∣∣Ht)) dt
∣∣∣∣∣Hu
)
= 0
(7)
and this means that the process Ξt, t ≥ 0:
Ξt :=
∫ t
0
(
E(1[0,τ ]Vu|Hu)− E(1[0,τ ](u)H(u, ξu)|Hu)− λ(u)E(
∫ τ
u∧τ
∂2H(s, ξs−)dXs + [∂2H(·, ξ·), X·]τu∧τ |Hu
)
du
is an H-martingale with bounded variation. In particular this implies that, for a.a. t ≥ 0,
E
(
1[0,τ ](t)Vt
∣∣Ht)−E (1[0,τ ](t)H(t, ξt)∣∣Ht)−λ(t)E(∫ τ
t∧τ
∂2H(s, ξs−)dXs + [∂2H(·, ξ·), X·]τt∧τ |Ht
)
= 0, a.s.
Since τ is an H-stopping time, then for a.a. t and for a.a. ω ∈ {τ ≥ t}, or equivalently a.s. on the stochastic
interval [0, τ ] , we can write
Vt −H(t, ξt)− λ(t)E
(∫ τ
t
∂2H(s, ξs)d
−Xs
∣∣∣∣Ht) = 0. (8)
Where we have used a shorthand notation by means of d−Xs as the backward integral in the sense of Revuz
and Yor (1999) (see page 144), here extended to semimartingales with jumps. As a summary we have the
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following necessary condition to help identifying good candidates as insider’s optimal strategies.
Theorem 6 An admissible triple (H,λ,X) such that X is locally optimal for the insider satisfies equations
(6) and (8) a.s. in [0, τ ].
Remark 7 Note that (6) and (8) are also true in the case that λ(t) is a piecewise strictly positive constant
function including the situation treated in Danilova (2010).
In the sequel we study two different cases of knowledge of τ from the insider’s perspective. First the case in
which the insider knows τ , the exact time of release of information about the firm value, then we study the
case when the insider does not know τ .
3 Case when τ is known to the insider
Let σ(τ) be the σ-algebra generated by τ . Then we consider the case in which σ(τ) ⊆ H0. At any time t,
the insider relies on the information given by:
Ht = σ¯(Ps, ηs, τ, 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
Moreover, we assume that τ is bounded, so the analysis here below is consistent with the one of the previous
section.
3.1 Necessary conditions for the equilibrium
Our first observation is that optimal strategies lead the market price to the fundamental one, making the
market be efficient. In fact we have the following proposition.
Proposition 8 If τ is known to the insider and (H,λ,X) is admissible with X locally optimal, then the
optimal strategy X has no jump at τ and the market is efficient, i.e.
Vτ− = H(τ, ξτ−) = H(τ, ξτ ) = Pτ a.s.
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Proof. By the assumptions (A1) and (A2), equation (8) can be rewritten:
Vt −H(t, ξt)− λ(t)E
(∫ τ
t
∂2H(s, ξs)d
−Xs
∣∣Ht)
= Vt −H(t, ξt)− λ(t)
∫ τ
t
E(∂2H(s, ξs)θs|Ht)ds
− λ(t)
τ∑
t
E (∂2H(s, ξs)∆Xs|Ht)
− λ(t)E
(∫ τ
t
λ(s)∂22H(s, ξs)(σ
2
M (s) + σZ,M (s))ds
∣∣∣∣Ht)
= 0, a.s. on [0, τ ].
Now by assumption (A3) and Corollary (2.4) in Revuz and Yor (1999), we have that
lim
t↑τ
E
(∫ τ
t
∂2H(s, ξs)|θs|ds
∣∣∣∣Ht) = 0.
Analogously for the term
lim
t↑τ
λ(t)E
(∫ τ
t
λ(s)∂22H(s, ξs)(σ
2
M (s) + σZ,M (s))ds
∣∣∣∣Ht) = 0, a.s.
Whereas
lim
t↑τ
λ(t)
τ∑
t
E (∂2H(s, ξs)∆Xs|Ht)
= λ(τ)∂2H(τ, ξτ )∆Xτ ,
and consequently
Vτ− −H(τ, ξτ−)− λ(τ)∂2H(τ, ξτ )∆Xτ = 0. (9)
Now consider equation (6) and recall that H0 ⊆ Hτ−. Since V is an H-martingale and τ ∈ H0, then
E(Vτ |Hτ−) = Vτ− (see Revuz and Yor (1999), Ch. 2, Prop. 2.7). Moreover, since X is H-predictable, Z is
continuous, and τ ∈ H0, we have
E
(
(H(τ, ξτ )) ∆Xτ + λ(τ)∂2H(τ, ξτ ) (∆Xτ )
2
∣∣∣Hτ−) = H(τ, ξτ )∆Xτ + λ(τ)∂2H(τ, ξτ ) (∆Xτ )2 .
Therefore equation (6) gives
(Vτ− −H(τ, ξτ )) ∆Xτ − λ(τ)∂2H(τ, ξτ ) (∆Xτ )2 = 0. a.s. (10)
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and if ∆Xτ 6= 0, it turns out that
Vτ− −H(τ, ξτ )− λ(τ)∂2H(τ, ξτ )∆Xτ = 0.
Comparing the above equation with (19) we have that H(τ, ξτ ) = H(τ, ξτ−), which contradicts ∆Xτ 6= 0,
being H strictly increasing in the second variable. This shows that a (locally) optimal strategy X has no
jump at τ and, by (19), that Vτ− = H(τ, ξτ−) = H(τ, ξτ ).
Remark 9 In Aase et al. (2012a) it was already observed that market efficiency, that is the convergence
of market prices to the fundamental ones, is a consequence of the optimality of the insider’s strategy. Here
we obtain an extension of this result for a more general behavior of the fundamental value and the demand
process of the noise traders.
Remark 10 This efficiency situation is also the case in Campi and Çetin (2007). In our notation they have
the signal η = τ¯ , with τ¯ an H-stopping time, Vt = 1{τ¯>1} and the release time is τ = τ¯ ∧ 1. So, τ ∈ H0 and
it is bounded. Then, they obtain
1{τ¯>1} −H(τ¯ ∧ 1, ξτ¯∧1) = 0, a.s.
They also assume that τ¯ is the first passage time of a standard Brownian motion independent of Z.
Remark 11 If we take Vt ≡ V and τ ≡ 1 then we are in Back’s framework (1992). There it is shown that
market prices converge to V when t→ 1.
Hereafter we consider necessary conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. These conditions show the
synergy between the optimal insider strategy and the pricing rule in an equilibrium state. Note that one
cannot use these conditions to (uniquely) identify a pricing rule. The choice of pricing rules is not unique.
In the next subsection we will study necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium
for a wide class of pricing rules. Before that we have the following.
Proposition 12 Consider an admissible triple (H,λ,X). If (H,λ,X) is a local equilibrium, we have:
(i) H(τ, ξτ ) = Vτ− a.s.
(ii) ∂1H(t, ξt) +
1
2
∂22H(t, ξt)λ
2(t)E
(
σ2Z(t)− σ2M (t)|Ft
)
= 0 a.s.on [0, τ).
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Proof. (i) It is just Proposition 8. (ii) By using Itô’s formula on H(t,ξt)λ(t) , with (A2) applied, we have
E
(∫ τ
t
1
λ(s)
∂2H(s, ξs−)dξs |Ht
)
= E
(
H(τ, ξτ )
λ(τ)
∣∣∣∣Ht)− H(t, ξt)λ(t)
− E
(∫ τ
t
(
− λ
′(s)
λ2(s)
H(s, ξs) +
∂1H(s, ξs)
λ(s)
+
1
2
∂22H(s, ξs)λ(s)σ
2
Y (s)
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ht)
− E
 ∑
t≤s≤τ
(
∆H(s, ξs)
λ(s)
− ∂2H(s, ξs−)∆Xs
)∣∣∣∣Ht
 ,
where σ2Y (s) :=
d[Y,Y ]cs
ds . Now X is locally optimal, given (H,λ) , by the equation (8) and the Proposition 8
we can write:
0 = Vt − λ(t)E
(
Vτ
λ(τ)
∣∣∣∣Ht)
+ λ(t)
∫ τ
t
E
(
− λ
′(s)
λ2(s)
H(s, ξs) +
∂1H(s, ξs)
λ(s)
+
1
2
∂22H(s, ξs)λ(s)σ
2
Y (s)
∣∣∣∣Ht)ds
+ λ(t)
∑
t≤s≤τ
E
(
∆H(s, ξs)
λ(s)
− ∂2H(s, ξs)∆Xs
∣∣∣∣Ht)
− λ(t)
∫ τ
t
E
(
λ(s)∂22H(s, ξs)(σ
2
M (s) + σZ,M (s))ds|Ht
)
.
Hence, we have
0 =
Vt
λ(t)
− Vt
λ(τ)
+
∫ τ
t
E
(
− λ
′(s)
λ2(s)
H(s, ξs) +
∂1H(s, ξs)
λ(s)
+
1
2
∂22H(s, ξs)λ(s)(σ
2
Y (s)− 2σM,Y (s))
∣∣∣∣Ht)ds
+
∑
t≤s≤τ
E
(
∆H(s, ξs)
λ(s)
− ∂2H(s, ξs)∆Xs
∣∣∣∣Ht) . (11)
where σM,Y (t) :=
d[M,Y ]t
dt = σ
2
M (t) + σM,Z(t). By taking increments of the different terms of the previous
expression when we have an infinitesimal increment of time, we can identify the predictive and martingale
parts. In fact
d
(
Vt
λ(t)
− Vt
λ(τ)
)
= − λ
′(t)
λ2(t)
Vtdt+
(
1
λ(t)
− 1
λ(τ)
)
dVt,
d
∫ τ
t
E
(
− λ
′(s)
λ2(s)
H(s, ξs) +
∂1H(s, ξs)
λ(s)
+
1
2
∂22H(s, ξs)λ(s)(σ
2
Y (s)− 2σM,Y (s))
∣∣∣∣Ht)ds
=
(
λ′(t)
λ2(t)
H(t, ξt)− ∂1H(t, ξt)
λ(t)
− 1
2
∂22H(t, ξt)λ(t)(σ
2
Y (t)− 2σM,Y (t))
)
dt+ dM
(t)
t ,
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where, for fixed u, M (u) is the martingale
M
(u)
t := E
(∫ τ
u
(
− λ
′(s)
λ2(s)
H(s, ξs) +
∂1H(s, ξs)
λ(s)
+
1
2
∂22H(s, ξs)λ(s)(σ
2
Y (s)− 2σM,Y (s))
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ht) , t ≥ 0
and
d
∑
t≤s≤τ
E
(
∆H(s, ξs)
λ(s)
− ∂2H(s, ξs)∆Xs
∣∣∣∣Ht)
= −∆H(t, ξt)− ∂2H(t, ξt)∆ξt
λ(t)
+ dL
(t)
t ,
with
L
(u)
t := E
 ∑
u≤s≤τ
∆H(s, ξs)
λ(s)
− ∂2H(s, ξs)∆Xs
∣∣∣∣Ht
 .
Therefore we have that
0 =
λ′(t)
λ2(t)
Vt − λ
′(t)
λ2(t)
H(t, ξt) +
∂1H(t, ξt)
λ(t)
+
1
2
∂22H(t, ξt)λ(t)(σ
2
Y (t)− 2σM,Y (t))
+
∆H(t, ξt)− ∂2H(t, ξt)∆ξt
λ(t)
, a.s. on [0, τ ] . (12)
Then a.s on [0, τ ], the continuous and jump parts of the r.h.s of the previous equation will be equal to zero.
So
∆H(t, ξt)− ∂2H(t, ξt)∆ξt
λ(t)
= 0, a.s. on [0, τ ] (13)
and
0 =
λ′(t)
λ2(t)
Vt − λ
′(t)
λ2(t)
H(t, ξt) +
∂1H(t, ξt)
λ(t)
+
1
2
∂22H(t, ξt)λ(t)(σ
2
Y (t)− 2σM,Y (t)). (14)
Now, since we are in a local equilibrium, prices are rational, given X, so by taking conditional expectations
w.r.t Ft we have
0 =
λ′(t)
λ2(t)
(E(Vt|Ft)− E(H(t, ξt)|Ft)) + ∂1H(t, ξt)
λ(t)
+
1
2
∂22H(t, ξt)λ(t)E
(
σ2Y (t)− 2σM,Y (t)|Ft
)
=
∂1H(t, ξt)
λ(t)
+
1
2
∂22H(t, ξt)λ(t)
(
σ2Y (t)− 2E (σM,Y (t)|Ft)
)
. (15)
Proposition 13 If the pricing rule H(t, ·) is linear, for any t, or the optimal strategy X is absolutely
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continuous, then we have: (i) Y is a local martingale (ii) If Vt 6= Pt a.s.on [0, τ), then λ(t) = λ0,
Proof. (i) In those cases, from (13) and (15) we have
dPt = dH(t, ξt) = λ(t)∂2H(t, ξt−)dYt,
and, since P· is a martingale and λ(t)∂2H(t, y) > 0, we have that Y is a local martingale. (ii) From (13)
and (15) we have that
λ′(t)
λ2(t)
Vt − λ
′(t)
λ2(t)
H(t, ξt) = 0,
then Vt 6= H(t, ξt) om [0, τ) implies that λ′(t) = 0.
3.2 Characterization of the equilibrium
In this subsection we shall give necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee that (H,λ,X) is an equilib-
rium in the context of pricing rules satisfying
0 = ∂1H(t, y) +
1
2
∂22H(t, y)λ(t)
2σ2Z(t) , a.a. t ≥ 0, y ∈ R. (16)
Note that this condition is close to condition (ii) in Proposition 12, that is a necessary condition for the
equilibrium. We shall also assume that σ2Z(t) is deterministic and that V is continuous. Then, when the
release time τ is known and independent of Z, we have the following necessary and sufficient conditions for
the equilibrium:
Theorem 14 Consider an admissible triple (H,λ,X) with (H,λ) satisfying (16). If
(i) λ(t) = λ0,
(ii) H(τ, ξτ ) = Vτ
(iii) [Xc, Xc] ≡ 0,
(iv) Y = X + Z is an F- local martingale without jumps ,
then (H,λ,X) is an equilibrium. If Vt 6= Pt for all t ≤ τ , the conditions (i)-(iv) above are also necessary.
Proof. Assume (i)-(iv). The proof follows the same steps as in Corcuera et al. (2014). Set, for T ∈ [0,∞),
i(y, v, T ) (ω) :=
∫ H−1(T,·)(v)
y
v −H(T, x)
λ0
dx,
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and
I(t ∧ τ, y, v) := E( i(y + λ0(Zτ − Zt∧τ ), v, τ)| τ), t ≥ 0.
First note that
E( H(τ, y + λ0(Zτ − Zt∧τ ))| τ) = H(t ∧ τ, y).
In fact, by (16) and (A2) (also for X ≡ 0) , (H(t ∧ τ, λ0Zt∧τ ))t≥0 is an H-martingale, so, since Z and τ are
independent, Z has independent increments, and τ is bounded, we have that,
H(t ∧ τ, y) = E(H(τ, λ0Zτ )|λ0Zt∧τ = y, τ) = E( H(τ, y + λ0(Zτ − Zt∧τ ))| τ), for all t ≥ 0.
(I(t ∧ τ, Zt∧τ , v))t≥0 is also an H- martingale. In fact, since Z and τ are independent and Z has independent
increments:
I(t ∧ τ, y, v) = E( i(y + λ0(Zτ − Zt∧τ ), v, τ)| τ)
= E( i(λ0Zτ , v, τ)|λ0Zt∧τ = y, τ),
and we have that
∂2I(t ∧ τ, y, v) = E (∂1i(y + λ0(Zτ − Zt∧τ ), v, τ)| τ)
= E
(
−v −H(τ, y + λ0(Zτ − Zt∧τ )
λ0
∣∣∣∣ τ) = −v −H(t ∧ τ, y)λ0 . (17)
We can take the derivative under the integral sign because H(τ (ω) , ·) is monotone and E(H(τ, λ0Zτ )) <∞
and, from (16) we obtain
∂12I +
1
2
∂222Iλ
2
0σ
2
Z(t) = 0
so
∂1I +
1
2
∂22Iλ
2
0σ
2
Z(t) = C(t, v),
where C(t, v) is a function depending only on t and v. Now since (I(t ∧ τ, Zt∧τ , v))t≥0 is a martingale, it
turns out that C(t, v) = 0 a.a. t ≥ 0. Then we obtain that
∂1I +
1
2
∂22Iλ
2
0σ
2
Z(t) = 0. (18)
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Now, consider any admissible strategy X, by using Itô’s formula, we have
I(τ, ξτ , Vτ ) = I(0, 0, V0) +
∫ τ
0
∂3I(t, ξt, Vt)dVt +
∫ τ
0
∂1I(t, ξt, Vt)dt
+
∫ τ
0
∂2I(t, ξt−, Vt)dξt +
1
2
∫ τ
0
∂22I(t, ξt, Vt)d[ξ
c, ξc]t
+
∫ τ
0
∂23I(t, ξt, Vt)d[ξ
c, V ]t +
1
2
∫ τ
0
∂33I(t, ξt, Vt)σ
2
V dt
+
∑
0≤t≤τ
(∆I(t, ξt, Vt)− ∂2I(t, ξt−, Vt)∆ξt) .
By construction, ξ0 = 0, by (i) dξt = λ0dYt. Now we have that
d[ξc, ξc]t = λ
2
0d[X
c, Xc]t + 2λ
2
0d[X
c, Z]t + λ
2
0σ
2
Z(t)dt.
Also by (17) and the fact that V and Z are independent,
∂23I(t, ξt, Vt)d[ξ
c, V ]t = − 1
λ0
d[ξc, V ]t = −d[X,V ]t,
then using (17) and (18), and the fact that Z has not jumps, we get
I(τ, ξτ , Vτ ) = I(0, 0, V0) +
∫ τ
0
∂3I(t, ξt, Vt)dVt +
∫ τ
0
(Pt− − Vt)(dXt + dZt)
+
1
2
∫ τ
0
∂22I(t, ξt, Vt)λ
2
0d[X
c, Xc]t − [X,V ]τ + 1
2
∫ τ
0
∂33I(t, ξt, Vt)σ
2
V dt
+
∫ τ
0
∂22I(t, ξt, Vt)λ
2
0d[X
c, Zc] +
∑
0≤t≤τ
(∆I(t, ξt, Vt)− ∂2I(t, ξt−, Vt)λ0∆Xt)
Subtracting [P,X]τ from both sides and rearranging the terms, we obtain
∫ τ
0
(Vt − Pt−)dXt − [P,X]τ + [X,V ]τ −
(
I(0, 0, V0) +
1
2
∫ τ
0
∂33I(t, ξt, Vt)σ
2
V dt
)
= −I(τ, ξτ , Vτ ) +
∫ τ
0
∂3I(t, ξt−, Vt)dVt +
∫ τ
0
(Pt − Vt)dZt
+
1
2
∫ τ
0
∂22I(t, ξt, Vt)λ
2
0d[X
c, Xc]t +
∫ τ
0
∂22I(t, ξt, Vt)λ
2
0d[X
c, Zc]t
+
∑
0≤t≤τ
(∆I(t, ξt, Vt)− ∂2I(t, ξt−, Vt)λ0∆Xt)− [P,X]τ . (19)
We have that
[P,X]τ = [P
c, Xc]τ +
∑
0≤t≤τ
∆Pt∆Xt.
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Then Itô’s formula for H shows that the continuous local martingale part of P is
∫
∂H
∂y (t, ξt)dξ
c
t , so by using
(17), we obtain
[P c, Xc]τ =
[∫ ·
0
∂1H(t, ξt)dξ
c
t , X
c
]
τ
=
∫ τ
0
∂1H(t, ξt)d [ξ
c, Xc]t
=
∫ τ
0
∂22I(t, ξt, Vt)λ
2
0d [X
c, Xc]t +
∫ τ
0
∂22I(t, ξt, Vt)λ
2
0d [X
c, Z]t ,
and
λ0∂2I(t, ξt−, Vt)∆Xt + ∆Pt∆Xt = (Pt− − Vt)∆Xt + ∆Pt∆Xt
= (Pt − Vt)∆Xt = λ0∂2I(t, ξt, Vt)∆Xt.
Substituting the above relationships in the right-hand side of the equation (19), it becomes
− I(τ, ξτ , Vτ ) +
∫ τ
0
∂3I(t, ξt, Vt)dVt +
∫ τ
0
(Pt − Vt)dZt − 1
2
∫ τ
0
∂22I(t, ξt, Vt)λ
2
0d[X
c, Xc]t
+
∑
0≤t≤τ
(I(t, ξt, Vt)− I(t, ξt−, Vt)− λ0∂2I(t, ξt, Vt)∆Xt) .
Now it is important to note that ∂33I(t, y, v) does not depend on y and so ∂33I(t, ξt, Vt) does not depend of
ξ. Then I(0, 0, V0) + 12
∫ τ
0
∂33I(t, ξt, Vt)σ
2
V dt is actually fixed ω, a lower bound for any strategy. Then we
will show that, taken the expectation, the right-hand side of (19) is non-positive. The result follows from
the following points.
1. We know that λ0∂22I(τ, ξτ , Vτ ) = ∂2H(τ, ξτ ) > 0 and that λ0∂2I(τ, ξτ , Vτ ) = −Vτ + H(τ, ξτ ) so by
hypothesis (ii) we have a maximum value of −I(τ, ξτ , Vτ ) for our strategy.
2. The processes
∫ ·
0
∂3I(t, ξt, Vt)dVt and
∫ ·
0
(Pt − Vt)dZt are H-martingales, hence they have null expecta-
tion.
3. By (17) and H being increasing monotone, we have that ∂22I > 0, and the measure d[Xc, Xc] ≥ 0, so
−1
2
∫ τ
0
∂22I(t, ξt, Vt)λ
2
0d[X
c, Xc]t ≤ 0,
and by hypothesis (iv) we obtain the maximum value for our strategy.
4. ∂22I > 0 (convexity) implies that
I(t, x+ h, v)− I(t, x, v)− ∂2I(t, x+ h, v)h ≤ 0.
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So, ∑
0≤t≤τ
(I(t, ξt− + λ0∆Xt, Vt)− I(t, ξt−, Vt)− ∂2I(t, ξt, Vt)λ0∆Xt) ≤ 0,
and has its maximum if and only if ∆Xt = 0, which is assumed at (iv).
5. Assumption (iv) and (ii) together with condition (A2) guarantee the rationality of prices. In fact from
condition (A2) and (16) we have that H(· ∧ τ, ξ·∧τ ) is an F-martingale, then from (ii), and on the set
{t ≤ τ} we have
E (H(τ, ξτ )| Ft) = E (Vτ | Ft) = E (E (Vτ |Ht)| Ft) = E (Vt| Ft) .
Conversely, if (H,λ,X) is an equilibrium, by point 3. σ2M = 0 and now by (14)
0 =
λ′(t)
λ2(t)
Vt − λ
′(t)
λ2(t)
H(t, ξt),
so if Vt 6= Pt, we have that λ(t) = λ0. Condition (ii) is (i) in Proposition 12. Also from (16), (13) and (15)
dPt = dH(t, ξt) = λ0∂2H(t, ξt−)dYt,
and, since P· is an F-martingale and λ0∂2H(t, y) > 0, we have that Y is an F-local martingale. Finally
from point 4, ∆Xt = 0 and Y = X + Z is a local martingale without jumps.
4 Case when τ is unknown to the insider
In this section we consider the case when the insider does not know the precise time τ of release of information.
Namely, the insider’s information flow is given by:
Ht = σ(Ps, ηs, τ ∧ s, 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
Moreover we assume that τ finite is independent of (V, P, Z), that P(τ > t) > 0 for all t ≥ 0 and that τ has
a density. Going back to Proposition 6, we can see that, on [0, τ ], equation (8) can be written as:
Vt −H(t, ξt)− λ(t)E(
∫ ∞
t
1[0,τ ](s)
(
∂2H(s, ξs)d
−Xs
) |Ht) = 0.
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Here we recall that the optimal total demand X for the insider satisfies (A1) - (A6). Then we have
0 =Vt −H(t, ξt)− λ(t)E
(∫ ∞
t
P(τ > s|Ht)
(
∂2H(s, ξs)d
−Xs
)∣∣∣∣Ht)
= Vt −H(t, ξt)− λ(t)
P (τ > t)
E
(∫ ∞
t
P(τ > s)
(
∂2H(s, ξs)d
−Xs
)∣∣∣∣Ht)
= Vt −H(t, ξt)− λ(t)P(τ > t)E
(∫ ∞
t
P(τ > s)∂2H(s, ξs)θsds
∣∣∣∣Ht)
− λ(t)
P(τ > t)
E
( ∞∑
t
P(τ > s)∂2H(s, ξs)∆Xs
∣∣∣∣∣Ht
)
− λ(t)
P(τ > t)
E
(∫ ∞
t
λ(s)P(τ > s)∂22H(s, ξs)(σ2M (s) + σZ,M (s))ds
∣∣∣∣Ht) on [0, τ ]. (20)
First of all we note that, by assumption (A3), and Corollary (2.4) in Revuz and Yor (1999) we have that
lim
t→∞E
(∫ ∞
t
P(τ > s)∂2H(s, ξs)|θs|ds
∣∣∣∣Ht) = 0, a.s.
Analogously for E (
∑∞
t P(τ > s)∂2H(s, ξs−)|∆Xs||Ht) and E
(∫∞
t
λ(s)P(τ > s)∂22H(s, ξs)(σ2M (s) + σZ,M (s))ds
∣∣Ht).
Then, from (20), we have that
lim
t→∞
(Vt −H(t, ξt))P(τ > t)
λ(t)
= 0, a.s. (21)
Applying the Itô’s formula to H(t,ξt)P(τ>t)λ(t) , t ≤ T , and studying the limit for T →∞, we have
E
(∫ ∞
t
P (τ > s) ∂2H(s, ξs−)dXs
∣∣∣∣Ht)
= lim
T→∞
E
(
H(T, ξT )P(τ > T )
λ(T )
∣∣∣∣Ht)− H(t, ξt)P(τ > t)λ(t)
− E
(∫ ∞
t
(∂s
(
P (τ > s)
λ(s)
)
H(s, ξs) +
P (τ > s)
λ(s)
∂1H(s, ξs)
+
1
2
∂22H(s, ξs)P (τ > s)λ(s)σ2Y (s))ds
∣∣∣∣Ht)
− E
( ∞∑
t
P(τ > s)∆H(s, ξs)
λ(s)
− P(τ > s)∂2H(s, ξs−)∆Xs
∣∣∣∣∣Ht
)
. (22)
Moreover, by (21), we have
lim
T→∞
E
(
H(T, ξT )P (τ > T )
λ(T )
∣∣∣∣Ht) = limT→∞E
(
VTP (τ > T )
λ(T )
∣∣∣∣Ht)
= Vt lim
T→∞
P(τ > T )
λ(T )
:= cVt, (23)
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where we assume that limT→∞
P(τ>T )
λ(T ) = c < ∞. By substituting (22) and (23) into (20), we obtain the
equation
0 = Vt
(
c− P (τ > t)
λ(t)
)
− E
(∫ ∞
t
(
∂s
(
P(τ > s)
λ(s)
)
H(s, ξs)
+
P(τ > s)
λ(s)
∂1H(s, ξs) +
1
2
∂22H(s, ξs)P (τ > s)λ(s)(σ2Y (s)− 2σM,Y (s))
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ht)
− E
( ∞∑
t
P(τ > s)∆H(s, ξs)
λ(s)
− P(τ > s)∂2H(s, ξs)∆Xs
∣∣∣∣∣Ht
)
. (24)
In the same way we did for the stochastic process appearing in the r.h.s. of the equation (11) we can identify
the predictive and martingale parts and we will obtain that
0 = ∂t
(
P (τ > t)
λ(t)
)
(Vt −H(t, ξt))+
+
P(τ > t)
λ(t)
∂1H(t, ξt) +
1
2
∂22H(t, ξt)P (τ > t)λ(t)(σ2Y (t)− 2σM,Y (t))
+
(
P(τ > t)∆H
λ(t)
− P(τ > t)
λ(t)
∂2H(t, ξt)∆ξt
)
. (25)
Now since we are in a local equilibrium prices are rational and by taking conditional expectations w.r.t Ft,
we obtain
0 =
P(τ > t)
λ(t)
∂1H(t, ξt) +
1
2
∂22H(t, ξt)P (τ > t)λ(t)
(
σ2Y (t)− 2E(σM,Y (t)|Ft)
)
+
(
P(τ > t)∆H
λ(t)
− P(τ > t)
λ(t)
∂2H(t, ξt)∆ξt
)
. (26)
So we have proved the following results:
Proposition 15 Consider an admissible triple (H,λ,X). Assume that limt→∞
P(τ>t)
λ(t) = c <∞. If (H,λ,X)
is a local equilibrium, we have:
∂1H(t, ξt) +
1
2
∂22H(t, ξt)λ
2(t)E
(
σ2Z(t)− σ2M (t)|Ft
)
= 0 a.s. on [0, τ ].
Proposition 16 Consider an admissible triple (H,λ,X). If (H,λ,X) is a local equilibrium, σ2Z(t) is deter-
ministic and satisfies (16) and limt→∞
P(τ>t)
λ(t) , we have:
(i) Y is a local martingale (27)
(ii) If Vt 6= Pt a.s.on [0, τ), then λ(t) = cP(τ > t), a.a.t ≥ 0 (c > 0) . (28)
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Remark 17 Analogously to the Proposition 13, we have that the same result is true when σ2Z(t) is not
deterministic but H(t, ·) is linear or the strategies are absolutely continuous, in both cases (27) and (28) are
also true.
Remark 18 Here we can draw conclusions similar to the one in Cho (2003) where he considers a risk-averse
insider (and a deterministic release time). Cho concludes that, in equilibrium, a risk-adverse insider would
do most of her trading early to avoid the risk that the prices get closer to the asset value, unless the trading
conditions become more favorable over time. Similarly in our case, when the (risk-neutral) insider does not
know the release time of information, she would trade early in order to use her piece of information before
the announcement time comes. This behavior would continue unless the price pressure decreases over time
providing more favorable trading also at a later time. A similar conclusion is obtained by Baruch (2002),
who studies exactly the same problem about the effect of risk-aversion for the insider, by assuming that the
noise trading is a Brownian motion with time varying instantaneous variance.
Example 19 We can consider the context of Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) where the authors assume
that V and Z are arithmetic Brownian motion with variances σV and σZ respectively, and τ follows an
exponential distribution with scale parameter µ, independent of (V, P, Z) . Then, by Proposition 16, we have
that, for a.a. t and a.a. ω ∈ {t < τ},
Vt −H(t, ξt)− λ(t)E
(∫ ∞
t
e−µ(s−t)∂2H(s, ξs)dXs
∣∣∣∣Ht) = 0.
And to have a local equilibrium, provided that Vt −H(t, ξt) 6= 0, we need λ(t) = λ0e−µt.
5 Explicit insider’s optimal strategies
In this section we shall apply our results to explicitly find the insider’s optimal strategy in equilibrium. We
will show how our general framework serves different models known in the literature presented as extensions
of the Kyle-Back model. In order to perform the explicit computations we will use techniques of enlargements
of filtrations.
To explain how enlargement of filtration enters the topic we consider a total demand Y = Z+X in equilibrium
given by:
Yt = Zt +
∫ t
0
θ(ηt;Yu, 0 ≤ u ≤ s)ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (29)
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Here X is absolutely continuous process with respect to the Lebesgue measure. We recall that Z is perceived
by the insider as anH-martingale independent of V· = E(f(ητ )|H·) and η. So since FY,η ⊆ H and Z is adapted
to FY,η, it is also an FY,η-martingale. Here FY,η = (FY,ηt )t≥0 is the filtration FY,ηt := σ¯(Ys, ηs, 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
On the other hand, Y is a local martingale when in equilibrium, as for the cases of Theorem 14, Proposition
12 and Proposition 16. Consequently (29) becomes the Doob-Meyer decomposition of Y when we enlarge
the filtration FY with the process η. We are then into a problem of enlargement of filtrations. However, in
our problem Z is fixed in advance and we want to obtain Y as a function of Z, fixed η, so we look in fact
for strong solutions of (29), whereas the results on enlargement of filtrations provide weak solutions. In this
sense the celebrated Yamada-Watanabe’s theorem is the result, when Z is Gaussian, that can be used to
obtain strong solutions from weak solutions. See, for instance, Theorem 1.5.4.4. in Jeanblanc et al. (2009).
These various examples correspond to different models that are extensions of the Kyle-Back model and where
the results about enlargement of filtrations can be applied, but we do not enter, however, into details to
show that the solutions of the corresponding stochastic differential equations appearing in the equilibrium
equation, are in fact strong solutions.
Example 20 (Back (1992)) Assume that Z is a Brownian motion with variance σ2 , V· ≡ V1 and the release
time τ = 1 . In equilibrium, if the strategy of the insider is optimal V1 = H(1, Y1). Since H(1, ·) can be
chosen freely because it is the boundary condition of equation (16) and if V1 has a continuous cumulative
distribution function, we can assume w.l.o.g that Y1 ≡N(0, σ2) . It is assumed that V1 (and consequently Y1)
is independent of Z. Then, see Example 1, page 306, in Jeulin and Yor (1985), we have that
Yt = Zt +
∫ t
0
Y1 − Ys
1− s ds,
is a Brownian motion with variance σ2. Hence, prices are rational and we recognize the equilibrium strategy
to be
Xt =
∫ t
0
Y1 − Ys
1− s ds, 0 ≤ t < 1.
Example 21 (Aase et al. (2012a)) Assume that τ = 1 and suppose that Z is given by
Zt =
∫ t
0
σsdWs
where σ is deterministic and V· ≡ Y1 is a N(0,
∫ 1
0
σ2sds) independent of Z. Then by Jeulin (1980), page 51,
Yt = Zt +
∫ t
0
Ys − Y1∫ 1
t
σ2udu
σ2sds,
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has the same law as Z. Then
Xt =
∫ t
0
Ys − Y1∫ 1
t
σ2udu
σ2sds
is the optimal strategy.
Example 22 (Campi and Çetin (2007)) If we want the aggregate process Y to be a Brownian motion that
reaches the value −1 for the first time at time τ¯ , and Z is also a Brownian motion then, by Example 3 in
Jeulin and Yor (1985), page 306,
Yt = Zt +
∫ t
0
(
1
1 + Ys
− 1 + Ys
τ¯ − s
)
1[0,τ¯ ](s)ds,
so, in this case ηt ≡ τ¯ , Vt ≡ 1{τ¯>1} and the release time is τ¯ ∧ 1.
Example 23 (Back and Pedersen (1998), Wu (1999), Danilova (2010)) The insider receives a continuous
signal
ηt = η0 +
∫ t
0
σsdWs,
where σs is deterministic, η0 is a zero mean normal random variable, W is a Brownian motion, both inde-
pendent of the Brownian motion Z, τ = 1. It is assumed that var(η1) = var(η0) +
∫ 1
0
σ2sds = 1, then
Yt = Zt +
∫ t
0
ηs − Ys
var(ηs)− sds, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
is a Brownian motion. This result can be obtained by the following proposition.
Set
Vt = V0 +
∫ t
0
σsdW
1
s , 0 ≤ t ≤ 1,
where σs is a deterministic function, V0 is a zero mean normal random variable, and
(
W 1,W 2
)
is a 2-
dimensional Brownian motion independent of V0.
Proposition 24 Assume that V ar(V1) = 1 and that
∫ t
0
ds
V ar(Vs)− s <∞ for all 0 ≤ t < 1,
then
Bt = W
2
t +
∫ t
0
Vs −Bs
V ar(Vs)− sds, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
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is a Brownian motion with B1 = V1.
Proof. Denote vr := V ar(Vr)
Bt =
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
u
1
vr − rdr
)
dW 2u +
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
u
1
vr − rdr
)
Vu
vu − udu,
so B is a centered Gaussian process, and for s ≤ t < 1,
E (BtBs) = exp
(
−
∫ t
s
1
vr − rdr
)
+ E
(∫ t
0
∫ s
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
u
1
vr − rdr
)
exp
(
−
∫ s
v
1
vr − rdr
)
VuVv
(vu − u) (vv − v)dudv
)
= exp
(
−
∫ t
s
1
vr − rdr
)∫ s
0
exp
(
−2
∫ s
u
1
vr − rdr
)
du
+
∫ t
s
∫ s
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
u
1
vr − rdr
)
exp
(
−
∫ s
v
1
vr − rdr
)
vv
(vu − u) (vv − v)dudv
+ 2
∫ s
0
∫ u
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
u
1
vr − rdr
)
exp
(
−
∫ s
v
1
vr − rdr
)
vv
(vu − u) (vv − v)du.
Then , since ∫ s
0
exp
(
−
∫ s
v
1
vr − rdr
)
vv
vv − vdv = s,
and
2
∫ s
0
exp
(
−2
∫ s
v
1
vr − rdr
)
vv
vv − vdv = 2s+
∫ s
0
exp
(
−2
∫ s
u
1
vr − rdr
)
du
we obtain that E (BtBs) = s. So for 0 ≤ t < 1 we have that (Bt) is a standard Brownian motion. On the
other hand
E(BtVt) = E
(∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
u
1
vr − rdr
)
VuVt
vu − udu
)
=
∫ t
0
exp
(
−
∫ t
u
1
vr − rdr
)
vu
vu − udu
= t,
therefore
E((Bt − Vt)2) = E(B2t ) + E(Vt2)− 2E(BtVt)
= t+ vt − 2t = vt − t,
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and, since by hypothesis v1 = 1, this means that
lim
t→1
Bt
L2
= V1,
then for all 0 ≤ t < 1
E
(∫ t
0
|Vs −Bs|
vs − s ds
)
<
∫ t
0
E
(
(Vs −Bs)2
) 1
2
vs − s ds =
∫ t
0
√
vs − sds <
√
2,
and this implies, by the monotone convergence theorem, that
lim
t→1
∫ t
0
|Vs −Bs|
vs − s ds =
∫ 1
0
|Vs −Bs|
vs − s ds <∞
and that B1 = limt→1Bt is well defined. Now, we have, by the uniqueness of the limit in probability, that
V1 = B1 a.s.
Another view of the problem of finding the equilibrium strategy is the following. Market makers observe Y
with dynamics
dYt = dZt + θ(Vt, Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t)dt,
V is not observed. Then, the dynamics of mt := E(Vt|FYt ) can be obtained in certain cases, basically when
Z and V are Gaussian diffusions, from the filtering theory, see for instance Theorem 12.1 in Liptser and
Shiryaev (1978). Now we can try to deduce θ(Vt, Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t) from the equilibrium condition: Pt = mt.
Even if V is not a Gaussian diffusion, but can be written in the form Vt = h(Dt) where h is a strictly
increasing function and D is a Gaussian diffusion, we can still apply the filtering results for the couple
(Y,D) .
In the following example we use the filtering approach to find the equilibrium strategy.
Example 25 (Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010)) The release time τ is unknown (so we cannot apply Propo-
sition 24),
dVt = σv(t)dB
v
t , V0 ∼ N(P0,Σ0), dZt = σz(t)dBzt , Z0 = 0.
Bv and Bz being independent Brownian motions, σv(t) and σz(t) deterministic functions. Then, if we look
for pricing rules such that
dPt = λtdYt
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and strategies
dXt = βt(Vt − Pt)dt
with βt deterministic, we have
dPt = λtβt(Vt − Pt)dt+ λtσz(t)dBzt .
Let denote mt = E(Vt|FYt ), by standard filtering results (see for instance Lipster and Shiryayev (2001)) we
have
dmt =
Σtβt
λtσ2z(t)
(dPt − λtβt(mt − Pt)dt), d
dt
Σt = σ
2
v(t)−
(Σtβt)
2
σ2z(t)
,
where Σt is the filtering error. Now, we can recover the identity Pt = mt, if and only if we impose Σtβt =
λtσ
2
z(t) (remember that by construction P0 = m0 = E(V0)) . Then
Σt = Σ0 +
∫ t
0
σ2v(s)ds−
∫ t
0
σ2z(s)λ
2
sds, βt =
λtσ
2
z(t)
Σt
.
Note that in particular we obtain that
Yt = Zt +
∫ t
0
λsσ
2
z(s)
(
Vs −
∫ s
0
λudYu
)
Σs
ds,
is the Doob-Meyer decomposition of the martingale Y in the filtration generated by (Z, V ). Now if we assume
σ2z(t) = σ
2
z , independent of t, and we take into account that in the equilibrium λt = λ0e−µt, we have that
Σt = Σ0 +
∫ t
0
σ2v(s)ds− σ2z
λ20
2µ
(1− e−2µt), βt = σ
2
zλ0e
−µt
Σt
.
However λ0 is not determined. We need an additional condition to fix λ0. One possibility is to impose that
lim
t→∞Σt = 0.
In such a case
0 = Σ0 +
∫ ∞
0
σ2v(s)ds− σ2z
λ20
2µ
,
and
λ0 =
√
2µ(Σ0 +
∫∞
0
σ2v(s)ds)
σ2z
.
Note that if σ2v(t) = σ2v there is no solution! Another possibility, according with Proposition 16, is to take T
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such that
Σt = 0, for all t ≥ T
and then Pt = Vt for t ≥ T . But this implies, for σ2v(t) = σ2v ,
0 = Σ0 + σ
2
vT − σ2z
λ20
2µ
(1− e−2µT )
= Σ0 + σ
2
vT − σ2z
λ2T
2µ
(e2µT − 1).
Now if we assume a smooth transition from the absolutely continuous strategy then σ2v − σ2zλ2t = 0 for all
t ≥ T and λt = λT = σvσz , for all t ≥ T . Finally
dPt = λtdYt = λtdXt + λtdZt = dVt, t ≥ T
so
dXt =
σz
σv
dVt − dZt,
and T is the solution of
Σ0 + σ
2
vT =
σ2v
2µ
(e2µT − 1).
This is exactly what Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) obtain. It is important to remark that the authors
obtain a limit of optimal strategies when passing from the discrete version of the model to the continuous
one. This limit strategy is such that there is an endogenously determined time T such that, if t ≤ T , then
the limit strategy is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and, if t > T , the strategy is
not of bounded variation. In this case an insider’s optimal strategy, between times T and τ , would yield to
giving out the full information to the market by making the market prices match the fundamental value. They
claim that this limit strategy is not optimal for the continuous time model and that we need to consider the
discrete time model to realize about its existence. However this limit strategy can be obtained has a limit of
strategies for the continuous model when we restrict the class of strategies to the set of absolutely continuous
strategies and we try to maximize the wealth. In fact if we have a sequence of strategies
(
X(n)
)
n≥1, their
corresponding wealth is given by
W (n)τ = X
(n)
τ V
(n)
τ −
∫ τ
0
P
(n)
t− dX
(n)
t − [P (n), X(n)]τ .
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Then, if we assume that (X(n), P (n), V (n)) u.c.p→
n→∞ (X,P, V ) we obtain that
X(n)τ V
(n)
τ −
∫ τ
0
P
(n)
t− dX
(n)
t
u.c.p→
n→∞ XτVτ −
∫ τ
0
Pt−dXt
but in general
[P (n), X(n)]τ 9 [P,X]τ ,
For instance if X(n) is a bounded variation process X is not necessarily a bounded variation one. Then the
gain limit for this limit of strategies after T, on the set {τ > T}, is given by
VτXτ − VTXT −
∫ τ
T
Pt−dXt =
∫ τ
T
Xt−dVt +
∫ τ
T
Vt−dXt +
∫ τ
T
d[V,X]t −
∫ τ
T
Pt−dXt
=
∫ τ
T
(Vt− − Pt−) dXt +
∫ τ
T
d[V,X]t +
∫ τ
T
Xt−dVt.
Now if we take the (conditional) expectation, last term of the right-hand side cancels and we obtain that
E
(
VτXτ − VTXT −
∫ τ
T
Pt−dXt
∣∣∣∣HT) = E(∫ τ
T
(Vt− − Pt−) dXt +
∫ τ
T
d[V,X]t
∣∣∣∣HT) .
Finally, since for the limit strategy Vt− = Pt− , t > T , in the conditions of Example 19, we obtain that there
is a profit after T given by
E
(∫ ∞
T
e
−µ(t−T )
d[V,X]t
∣∣∣∣HT) = σzσv ∫ ∞
T
e
−µ(t−T )
dt =
σzσv
µ
> 0.
Now we can justify the condition Σ˙T = 0. The expected wealth for the insider with this kind of strategies is
given by
J(X) = E
(∫ T∧τ
0
(Vt − Pt)θtdt
)
+ E
(∫ τ
T∧τ
d[V,X]t
)
= E
(∫ T∧τ
0
βt(Vt − Pt)2dt
)
+ E
(∫ τ
T∧τ
d[V,X]t
)
= E
(∫ T
0
1[0,τ ](t)βt(Vt − Pt)2dt
)
+ E
(∫ ∞
T
1[0,τ ](t)d[V,X]t
)
=
∫ T
0
P(τ > t)βtΣtdt+
∫ ∞
T
P(τ > t)
σ2v
λt
dt
=
∫ T
0
e
−µt
βtΣtdt+ σ
2
v
∫ ∞
T
e
−µt
λt
dt = σ2z
∫ T
0
e
−µt
λtdt+ σ
2
v
∫ ∞
T
e
−µt
λt
dt.
Then if we impose that T is optimal, we have the condition
σ2ze
−µT
λT − σ2v
e
−µT
λT
= 0,
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that is
λT =
σv
σz
,
and this is equivalent to Σ˙T = 0. Note that other equilibria are possible by taking λt 6= λT when t > T.
Remark 26 It can be proved that the linearity of the strategies assumed in the previous example implies that
the equilibrium pricing rules have to be linear as well. This interesting result can be seen also in Aase et al.
(2012a).
Example 27 Another interesting example is that of Campi et al. (2013). There, authors consider a default-
able stock. The default time is modeled as the first time that a Brownian motion, say B, hits the barrier −1,
as in the above Example 22 . However in this case the default time, δ = inf{t ≥ 0, Bt = −1}, is not known
by the insider, but it is a stopping time for every trader. Instead, she observes the process
(
Br(t)
)
where r(t)
is a deterministic, increasing function with r(t) > t for t ∈ (0, 1), r(0) = 0, and r(1) = 1. This circumstance
allows the insider to know in advance the default time. The horizon of the market is t = 1. They also consider
a payoff of the kind f(B1) in case of no default. Note that δ = r(τ), where τ = inf{t ≥ 0, Br(t) = −1}. Then,
in this example the release time r(τ), the signal is ηt = Br(t) and the fundamental value is
Vt = 1{τ>t}E(f(B1)|Br(t)).
Moreover the aggregate demand of noise traders follows a Brownian motion, say W , so Z = W. Even though
τ , and consequently, δ is not known for the insider, they are predictable stopping times, and, by an extension
of the case considered in section 3, we will have that, the price pressure is constant and that the optimal
strategy moves prices to the fundamental one:
lim
δn↑δ
Pδn = Vδ,
where (δn) is any increasing sequence of stopping times that grows to δ. To find the explicit form of an
equilibrium strategy is not straightforward. However, if τ ≤ s ≤ V (τ) an equilibrium strategy is obtained
from a strong solution of
Ys = Ws +
∫ s
0
(
1
1 + Yu
− 1 + Yu
V (τ)− u
)
(u)du,
as we deduce from Example 22 above, the difficult part is to see what happens until time τ. It requires a quite
involved use of enlargement of filtrations and filtering techniques. See Campi et al. (2013b) for the details.
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